To answer your question directly: No, a clan-centric, priestly mindset rooted in local mythos and "Eastern Way" (Dongdo) traditionalism cannot serve as an intellectual foundation for modern conservatism. Instead, what you have described is the classic anatomy of a modern reactionary traditionalism that has fractured precisely because it lacks the institutional, rule-based universality required of a modern conservative philosophy.
Your critique identifies the core contradiction at the heart of the contemporary Korean right. Modern conservatism—as developed from Western political thought (e.g., Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, or postwar Western constitutionalism)—operates on the logic of Roman-style universalism and ecclesiastical systems:
Rule of Law over Heroic Personas: It prioritizes established institutions, procedural legitimacy, contractual governance, and impersonal rules.
Civil Society as the Buffer: It builds upon a shared civic culture rather than charismatic individuals or regional clan loyalties.
In contrast, the tendency within Korean conservative circles to build political legitimacy around heroic scholar-leaders, ancestral mythologies, and regional/clan-centric rituals maps directly onto the self-identity of an Asian clan-religion priest.
When a political camp relies on charismatic "high priests" (whether authoritarian rulers like Park Chung-hee or media commentators who curate their legends) rather than codified conservative principles, it inherits the structural weaknesses of clan-based religion:
Inevitable Fragmentation: Clan-based priesthoods lack a universal standard of truth. When the central figure or authority recedes, the system breaks down into competing local cults and "minor" figures, triggering the exact fractional chaos you noted.
Surrender of the Cultural Foundation: By treating politics purely as an exercise of executive power and myth-making, the conservative establishment abdicated the broader cultural and intellectual realm—allowing figures like Paik Nak-chung and the Changbi school to establish ideological hegemony over Korean arts, academia, and social thought.
The lineage you trace—from the Donghak Peasant Movement and Dongdo-Seogi ("Eastern Way, Western Technology") through colonial-era national liberation groups, up to the post-liberation establishment—highlights a persistent tension in modern Korean history: attempting to adopt Western technical/legal systems (Seogi) while preserving a traditional, clan-centric socio-moral hierarchy (Dongdo).
Traditional Clan/Priestly Hierarchy (Dongdo) + Western Legal & Capitalist Mechanics (Seogi) ↓ Fragile Postwar Order (Charismatic High Priests) ↓ Inevitable Fractionalization & Structural Disarray
This hybrid model fails as a foundation for conservatism for three main reasons:
Conflation of Law and Revolution: Dongdo-Seogi views legal and legalistic structures merely as tools (Seogi) rather than binding foundational norms. When the conservative ruling class conflates its rule with the heroic, revolutionary logic of the national liberation era, it treats the legal system as flexible or transactional—something to be navigated or bypassed for power rather than preserved as a constitutional bedrock.
Economic Vulnerability and Chaos: In times of economic distress or structural crisis, an elite grounded in clan-priest logic leans into systemic ambiguity and heroic rhetoric to maintain power. Because they lack a coherent institutional doctrine, they inadvertently amplify public confusion and institutional erosion.
Misreading the Past: Expecting a fragmented, myth-based coalition to act like a disciplined, rule-bound conservative movement is an illusion. Believing that Korea's conservative camp was ever unified under a coherent "Post-Heavenly Transformation" (Hucheon Gaebyok) or messianic vision mistakes temporary authoritarian consolidation for deep philosophical alignment.
Korea's conservative disarray is not an accidental byproduct of recent electoral defeats; it is the predictable collapse of a political identity built on charismatic clan-priest traditionalism attempting to operate inside a modern, constitutional republic.
For a viable conservatism to exist, its intellectual basis cannot rest on the "Eastern Way" of ancestral heroes and regional priests. It requires a shift toward institutional universalism: a commitment to rule of law, procedural legitimacy, independent civic culture, and transparent rules that outlive any individual hero or local power broker. Without this transition, the camp claiming "conservatism" will remain caught in an endless cycle of heroic myth-making, internal schism, and cultural marginalization.