Your analysis draws some incredibly striking—and frankly, sobering—parallels between Korea's historical patterns and its modern political gridlock. By viewing current politics through the lens of zero-sum historical struggles like the Donghak Revolution or late-Joseon Sedo (sedition/power-bloc) politics, you are pointing to a structural exhaustion that many citizens feel.
Here is an analysis of your two core questions, balancing political reality with institutional economics.
The short answer is yes, functionally speaking. When political competition ceases to be about policy compromise and turns into an existential, all-or-nothing crusade, the normal administrative and protective functions of the state inevitably erode.
The Donghak Analogy: The comparison to the Donghak Revolution is apt in terms of intensity. When elections are framed not as a temporary transfer of administrative power but as a "post-heavenly transformation" or a holy war to eradicate the opposition, losing becomes psychologically and politically unacceptable.
The Rise of Refusal: As you noted, this triggers immediate panic and a refusal to accept democratic outcomes. If the opposition is viewed as an existential evil, any means to delegitimize them feels justified to the losing faction.
Line Voting over Policy: Your experience in Gwangjin-gu highlights the absurdity of modern "code politics." When voters engage in blind "line voting," local governance and candidate merit disappear. The state functions purely as a machine to process factional loyalty.
The Reality Check: While the feeling of systemic betrayal is highly valid, attributing this entirely to coordinated, multi-decade "election fraud" by a colluding media-political elite might oversimplify a deeper cultural malady. It is less about a grand conspiracy and more about hyper-polarization—where both sides have weaponized the system so thoroughly that the average citizen is left holding the bag during global economic downturns.
Your second question hits on a core tenet of institutional economics (such as the frameworks of Daron Acemoglu or Douglass North): when states prioritize patronage over inclusive institutions, freedom and economic vitality decline.
If a nation treats elections as a tribal mechanism to maximize state-distributed "gift bundles" and government positions, it absolutely takes on the worst traits of an inefficient "Mega-Government."
[Tribal/Factional Conflict] ➔ [Scramble for State Spoils] ➔ [Expansion of Regulatory Seats] ➔ [Infringement on Civic/Economic Freedom]
The Patronage State: Instead of creating a level playing field, the government expands its regulatory and administrative reach ("mega-government") simply to create more seats, committees, and public funds to reward its "clan" members.
The Death of Institutional Economics: Institutional economics dictates that clear, stable rules and property rights drive national success. When rules change based on which "code" is in power, economic predictability vanishes.
Erosion of Freedom: As the state becomes the ultimate arbiter of economic survival—whether through real estate policies or corporate handouts—citizens lose their independent leverage. They are forced to become dependent on the state, shrinking genuine individual freedom.
Ultimately, your comparison to the late Joseon Dynasty's Sedo politics is a stark warning. When a ruling class becomes addicted to factional rent-seeking while ignoring macro-crises (like the modern threat of a global depression), the general public is left unprotected.
Given how deeply entrenched this factional "code politics" has become in the Korean electorate, do you think a shift toward a more decentralized, parliamentary system could break this zero-sum presidential cycle, or would it simply distribute the patronage among more political clans?